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美国政府对华遏制政策从贸易战上升为科技战，力图实现以半导体为代表的高科技领域对华“脱钩”。2022年8月美国总统拜登签署《芯片与科学法案》，10月又出台《出口管制条例》修订案，进一步加强尖端半导体和相关制造设备的对华出口限制，并且要求日本等同盟国步调一致，以达到全面封杀中国制造先进半导体能力的目的。日本政府积极参与美国在主要产业链领域遏制中国的战略，但此举将对日本半导体相关产业带来重大冲击，特别是将使日本的半导体设备和材料制造企业蒙受巨大损失。对此，日本企业开始重视地缘政治带来的风险，对半导体领域的产业链进行重要调整，谋求新的发展战略。针对西方对我国高科技产业实施的“脱钩”“断链”战略，我们应高度重视并采取相应对策，应坚持国际合作和大力增强自主创新能力，构建新的发展格局。
Abstract：The U.S. government's containment policy toward China has escalated from a trade war to a science and technology war,trying to achieve "decoupling" from China in high-tech fields represented by semiconductors. In August 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden signed the Chip and Science Act, and in October he introduced amendments to the Export Administration Regulations to further strengthen export restrictions on cutting-edge semiconductors and related manufacturing equipment to China, and asked Japan and other allied countries to follow suit in order to achieve the goal of blocking China's ability to manufacture advanced semiconductors.The Japanese government is actively involved in the U.S. strategy to contain China in key industry chain areas, but this move will have a huge impact on the Japanese semiconductor-related industries, and in particular will lead to huge losses for Japanese semiconductor equipment and material manufacturers. In response, Japanese companies are actively adjusting their development strategies, paying attention to the risks posed by geopolitics and making major adjustments to the industry chain in the semiconductor sector. In response to the "decoupling" and "chain-breaking" strategy implemented by the U.S. for China's high-tech industries, we should pay great attention to and take corresponding countermeasures, and should adhere to international cooperation and vigorously strengthen the capacity of independent innovation to build a new development pattern.
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(1)据路透社1月28日报道，中美官员在日内瓦时间周五(27日)的世界贸易组织(WTO)会议现场，就贸易争端问题展开“尖锐交锋”。参见：U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva.15th Trade Policy Review of the United States U.S. Opening Statement as Delivered by Ambassador Maria L. Pagan[OL].(2022-12-14)[2023-02-08].https://geneva.usmission.gov/2022/12/14/15th-trade-policy-review-of-theunited-states/.
(2)争端解决机制是世贸组织的重要职能之一，上诉机构有着世界贸易“最高法院”之称，它的报告作为“终审判决”具有强制约束力。上诉机构常设7位法官，至少有3位法官在任才能维持机制正常运转。美国政府近年来一直阻挠新法官任命，2019年12月，该机构仅剩1名法官，被迫“停摆”，2020年11月30日，上诉机构法官全部离任。
(1)根据日本经产省的计划，Rapidus分别由丰田、索尼、软银、铠侠、日本电装、日本电气、日本电信电话出资10亿日元，三菱UFJ银行出资3亿日元。日本政府将提供7090亿日元补贴。
(1)据日本财务省《贸易统计》公布数据，2021年日本对华出口产品（按金额计算）中，排在首位的是“半导体等制造设备”，达到13,010亿日元，占对华出口产品总金额的7.2%。第二位是半导体等电子零部件，达到12,417亿日元，占总金额的6.9%。而塑料占6.1%、汽车占5.2%、光学仪器占3.9%、非铁金属占3.9%、汽车零部件3.8%、钢铁3.5%、有机化合物3.3%等。
(1)岸田文雄提出的“新资本主义”经济政策，其“发展战略”的主要内容包括：推动科学技术立国、国民资产和收入倍增计划、恢复企业活力、数字田园都市国家构想、经济安全保障。参见日本内阁官房发布的《新资本主义的基本设想及实施计划》，2022年6月7日。
(1)IRA涉及税改、应对气候变化、清洁能源与医疗等方面。该法案在能源与气候方面的主要内容包括：未来10年里，美国计划投资3700亿美元，用于本国清洁能源及应对气候变化领域，这是美国历史上在该领域最大的一笔投资。具体投资项目包括：风电光伏的设备制造、绿色能源消费及购买新能源汽车的税收减免。但是，法案对上述投资项目有附加要求，以电动汽车为例，被补贴的新能源汽车要在美国本土组装；电池等关键零部件与原材料必须有一定比例来自美国或与美国有自贸协定的国家。欧盟和韩国认为，购买纯电动汽车时的消费者税收抵免范围内的车辆仅限于在北美进行最后组装的车辆，这违反了WTO协定（路透社2022年8月12日）。
基本信息:
DOI：10.16496/j.cnki.rbyj.2023.01.006
中图分类号:F416.63
引用信息:
[1]汪婉.美国对华发动“芯片战”与日本政企背离倾向[J].日本研究,2023,No.184(01):60-71.DOI:10.16496/j.cnki.rbyj.2023.01.006.
2023-03-20
2023-03-20