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国家间政策在“战略清晰”与“战略模糊”之间摇摆引发学术界对制衡行为的反思。在美国协同盟伴国家对华竞争趋于常态化的背景下，研判特朗普第二任期美日介入台海局势成为理解美日同盟对华战略清晰与否的重要案例。本文以“角色—群体互动”的视角，选取特朗普对台湾问题的在意程度、特朗普与建制派对台湾问题的偏好差异度两大变量，分析影响特朗普第二任期美国政府涉台战略清晰与否的逻辑机制，发现在其第二任期内特朗普对台湾问题的关心度较低但与建制派立场存在差异，因而建制派更有可能绕过特朗普而暗中推进涉台议程。反观日本则受其宪法以及美日指挥权密约等因素限制，在是否追随美国武力介入台海局势、是否仅提供后勤支援等选项之间摇摆，但其任何涉台军事动向均属干涉中国内政。本文认为，虽然在特朗普第二任期美日介入台海局势迈向“战略清晰”存在限度，但两国仍持续强化联合作战能力、营造所谓国际“武装台湾”舆论以及加大对台军售力度。与此同时，中国的又一重大战略机遇期已经出现，如能以谋势思维抓住“代序崛起”的历史性机遇，则可探寻反制美日干涉台湾问题的道路。
Abstract：The oscillation of state policies between so-called "strategic clarity" and "strategic ambiguity" has prompted reflection within the academic community regarding balancing behavior. Against the backdrop of the normalization of the US competition with China in coordination with its allies and partners, assessing US-Japan intervention in the Taiwan Strait situation during the second Trump term serves as an important case study for understanding the strategic clarity — or lack thereof — of the US-Japan alliance toward China. From the perspective of "individual-group interaction", this paper selects two major variables — Donald Trump's level of attentiveness to the Taiwan question and the degree of preference divergence between Trump and the establishment regarding the Taiwan question — to analyze the logical mechanisms that influence the degree of strategic clarity in the US government's Taiwan-related policy during his second term. The study finds that during his second term, Trump exhibits a low level of concern for the Taiwan question but maintains divergent positions from the establishment; consequently, the establishment is more likely to bypass Trump to covertly advance Taiwan-related agendas. Japan, by contrast, is constrained by factors such as its constitution and the secret US-Japan agreements on command authority. As a result, Japan vacillates between options such as whether to follow the US in intervening in the Taiwan Strait situation by force and whether to provide only logistical support. Nevertheless, any military moves by Japan regarding Taiwan constitute interference in China's internal affairs. This paper argues that although there are limits to the US and Japan moving toward so-called "strategic clarity" in their intervention in the Taiwan Strait situation during the second Trump term, both countries continue to strengthen joint operational capabilities, cultivate international public opinion for the so-called "arming Taiwan", and increase the scale of arms sales to Taiwan. At the same time, another period of important strategic opportunity for China has emerged. If China can seize the historic opportunity of "order-transformative rise" with a trend-shaping mindset, it can explore paths to counter US-Japan interference in the Taiwan question.
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(1)作者赴现场探访、观察以及匿名访谈所得。
(1)作者赴现场探访、观察以及匿名访谈所得。
(1)作者赴现场探访、观察以及匿名访谈所得。
(1)口头无异议是美国的一种投票方式，即在没有议员明确提出反对的情况下，不经过正式投票就通过法案。
(2)作者赴现场探访、观察以及匿名访谈所得。
基本信息:
中图分类号:D871.2;D831.3;D822.3
引用信息:
[1]洪云鑫,华浩男,孙太一.“迈向战略清晰”？特朗普第二任期美日介入台海态势的逻辑[J].日本研究().
基金信息:
浙江省哲学社会科学重点研究基地浙江工商大学东亚研究院课题(项目编号:24JDDYZX04)
2026-06-22
2026-06-22
2026-06-22