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“战术对冲”指日本在坚持日美同盟前提下，于战术层面对华调整政策、开展局部合作，以避免在东亚与中国直接冲突，区别于东南亚国家的战略性对冲，凸显日本受美国制约的特殊性。石破茂执政后的日本对华政策其政策本质是一种“弱战术对冲”。第二次安倍晋三内阁后期的对华战术对冲依托稳固的内政，在特朗普第一任期通过首脑互动、应对日美关系波动等实现了连贯的对华战术对冲；石破政府面临特朗普第二任期的国际压力，虽在政治、社会、军事层面尝试对冲，但受内政薄弱制约，且其外交能力不足，导致政策摇摆性显著，形成“弱战术对冲”。石破政府对华政策的“弱战术对冲”既是对外部压力的适应，也是对内部掣肘的被动反应，体现了日本作为中等强国，在国际体系压力与国内政治单元制约因素双重影响下对华政策的张力，突破了传统体系决定论视角，为理解中等强国在大国竞争中的战略选择提供了参考。
Abstract：Tactical hedging denotes Japan's recalibration of China policy at the tactical level — undertaking limited cooperation while upholding the U.S.–Japan alliance — in order to avert direct conflict with China in East Asia. This posture diverges from the strategic hedging practiced by Southeast Asian states, underscoring Japan's exceptional condition of operating under American constraints. The essence of Japan's China policy under Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru is a "weak tactical hedging". In the latter half of the second Abe cabinet(2017-2020), robust domestic political foundations enabled a coherent tactical hedging strategy vis-à-vis China, achieved through high-level interaction and agile management of U.S.-Japan fluctuations during the first Trump administration. By contrast, the Ishiba administration confronts the systemic pressures of Trump's second term. Although it attempts hedging across political, societal, and military dimensions, fragile domestic politics and limited diplomatic capital generate pronounced policy oscillations, crystallizing a "weak tactical hedging". This outcome represents both adaptation to external imperatives and a reactive response to internal constraints, illustrating the tension in Japan's China policy as a middle power caught between systemic coercion and unit-level domestic variables. Consequently, the case transcends traditional structural-determinist perspectives and offers a refined reference for comprehending strategic choices of middle powers in great-power competition.
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(1)本文将特朗普第一任政府时期（2017—2021年）简称为“特朗普1.0”时期，将2025年1月之后的特朗普第二任政府时期简称为“特朗普2.0”时期；将第二次安倍内阁（2012—2020年）划分为任内前期（2012—2016年）和任内后期（2017—2020年）。
(1)有关这方面的讨论，参见:Ikenberry, G John, Funabashi, Yoich, The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism:Japan and the World Order[M]. Brookings Institution Press, 2018；中西寛.戦後秩序の動揺と日本外交の課題[J].国際問題,2018(1).
(2)通过研究马来西亚的对华外交政策，郭清水在2013年发表的另一篇论文中指出，中小国家对大国采取避险战略，不仅仅与地理位置（Geographical Proximity）和权力不对称（Power Asymmetry）有关，还往往和这一对外战略是否有利于本国领导人维护国内执政有关。这一研究开拓了避险战略在国内政治层面作用的新研究视角。参见：Cheng-Chwee Kuik.Making Sense of Malaysia's China Policy:Asymmetry, Proximity, and Elite's Domestic Authority[J]. The Chinese Journal of International Politics,2013,6(4):429-467.
(1)有关新古典现实主义理论的经典理论讨论和案例研究，参见：S. Lobell, N. Ripsman, J. Taliaferro. Neoclassical Realism,the State, and Foreign Policy[M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2009;Ripsman N., Taliaferro J., Lobell S. Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics[M]. New York:Oxford University Press, 2016.
(2)有关同盟关系两难的理论探讨，参见：Glenn H. Snyde.The security dilemma in alliance politics[J]. World Politics, 1984,36(4):461-495.
(3)关于1971年7月佐藤政府收到有关尼克松即将于次年访华报告时的惊讶，参见：永野信利.天皇と鄧小平の握手―実録·日中交渉秘史[M].東京:行政問題研究所, 1983:第1章.
(1)参见：Bloomberg.トランプ大統領、日米安保破棄の考え側近に漏らしていた-関係者[EB/OL].(2019-06-25)[2025-08-26]. https://www.bloomberg.co.jp/news/articles/2019-06-25/PTMUOE6TTDS801.此外，2020年6月，曾经担任特朗普政府总统国家安全顾问的约翰·博尔顿（John Bolton）在《事发之室：白宫回忆录》中披露,特朗普曾要求日方从2021年起每年负担80亿美元的驻日美军费用，是日本原本负担经费（18亿美元）的4倍以上，否则就下令撤走所有驻日美军。他本人也曾在访日期间向日本国家安全保障局局长谷内正太郎传达了这一要求。根据博尔顿的解读，对日施压是特朗普政府一贯的谈判策略，以图令美方在谈判中处于强而有力的位置。详情参见：John Bolton. The Room Where it Happened:A White House Memoir[M].New York:Simon&Schuster, 2020.
(2)史密斯在她2019年出版的新著中详细讨论了冷战后日本对美国不确定的安全承诺的担忧，参见：Sheila, A. Smith.Japan Rearmed:The Politics of Military Power[M]. Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 2019.
(1)详细内容参见：石破茂.保守政治家：わが政策、わが天命[M].倉重篤郎編.東京:講談社, 2024:第2章.
基本信息:
DOI：10.16496/j.cnki.rbyj.2025.02.005
中图分类号:D822.331.3;D822.371.2
引用信息:
[1]张望.弱战术对冲：石破茂治下的日本对华政策[J].日本研究,2025,No.193(02):51-61.DOI:10.16496/j.cnki.rbyj.2025.02.005.
基金信息: